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Abstract—Despite the large amount of Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms for message-passing systems designed through the years,
only recent algorithms for the coordination of processes subject to Byzantine failures using shared memory have appeared. This paper
presents a new computing model in which shared memory objects are protected by fine-grained access policies, and a new shared
memory object, the Policy-Enforced Augmented Tuple Space (PEATS). We show the benefits of this model by providing simple and
efficient consensus algorithms. These algorithms are much simpler and require less shared memory operations, using also less
memory bits than previous algorithms based on access control lists (ACLs) and sticky bits. We also prove that PEATS objects are
universal, i.e., that they can be used to implement any other shared memory object, and present lock-free and wait-free universal
constructions.
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1I NTRODUCTION
D
ESPITE the large amount of Byzantine fault-tolerant
algorithms for message-passing systems designed
through the years (e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], and
[8]), only recent algorithms for the coordination of processes
subject to Byzantine failures using shared memory have
appeared [9], [10], [11]. This line of research complements
the current availability of several solutions for the con-
struction of dependable services on message-passing dis-
tributed systems subject to Byzantine failures [1], [2], [3],
[4], [6], [8]. These services can be seen as shared memory
objects emulated over message-passing systems, and the
clients that access the services can be seen as the processes
accessing the shared memory. The motivation for this
research is to answer a fundamental question: what is the
power of these shared memory objects to coordinate
processes that can fail in a Byzantine way, i.e., arbitrarily
[11]? From a more practical point of view, we are interested
in knowing if it is possible to elect a leader among these
processes or to solve fundamental problems like consensus
or mutual exclusion even if some processes are faulty. A
complementary question is—how costly is it to solve these
problems in terms of resilience and shared memory bits and
operations required? These questions are especially relevant
since Byzantine failures can be used to model the behavior
of malicious hackers and malware [12].
The first works in this area made several important
theoretical contributions. They have shown that simple
objects like registers and sticky bits [13] when protected by
access control lists (ACLs) are enough to solve consensus [9],
that the optimal resilience for strong consensus is n   3t þ 1
in this model [9], [11] (t is an upper bound on the number of
faulty processes and n is the total number of processes), and
that sticky bits with ACLs are universal, i.e., they can be
used to implement any shared memory object [11], to state
only some of those contributions.
Despite the undeniable importance of these theoretical
results, on the practical side, these works also show the
limitations of combining simple objects like sticky bits and
registers with ACLs: the amount of objects required and the
amount of requested operations in these objects are enor-
mous, making the developed algorithms impractical for real
systems. The reason for this is that the algorithms fall in a
combinatorial problem. There are n processes and k shared
memoryobjectsforwhichwehavetosetupACLs,associating
objects with processes in such a way that faulty processes
cannot invalidate the actions of correct processes [9].
This paper contributes to advancing the study of
Byzantine shared memory by modifying this model in
two aspects. First, this paper proposes the use of fine-grained
security policies to control the access to shared memory
objects. These policies allow us to specify when an
invocation to an operation in a shared memory object is to
be allowed or denied in terms of who invokes the operation,
what are the parameters of the invocation, and what is the
current state of the object. We call the objects protected by
these policies policy-enforced objects (PEOs).
Second, this paper uses only one type of shared memory
object: an augmented tuple space [14], [15]. This object, which
is an extension of the tuple space introduced in LINDA [16],
stores generic data structures called tuples. It provides
operations for the inclusion, removal, reading and condi-
tional inclusion of tuples.
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spaces (PEATS) are an attractive solution for the coordina-
tion of Byzantine processes. This paper provides algorithms
that are much simpler than previous ones based on sticky
bits and ACLs [9], [11]. They are also more efficient in terms
of number of bits, objects, and operations needed to solve a
certain problem. This comparison of apparently simple
objects like sticky bits with apparently complex objects like
tuple spaces may seem unfair but, in reality, the imple-
mentation of linearizable versions of both (the case we
consider here) involves similar protocols with similar
complexities when considering shared memory emulation
over message-passing [17]. For instance, both can be
implemented similarly using the aforementioned Byzantine
fault-tolerant systems based on state machine replication
[2], [3], [4].
The results presented have two main consequences on
the broad Byzantine fault tolerance research area. First, they
show that a well-designed shared memory object makes it
much easier to program synchronization protocols in the
asynchronous Byzantine fault model. Second, they show
that fine-grained policy enforcement is a much more
efficient model for protecting dependable services/objects
than ACLs, which are the standard mechanism used to
protect Byzantine fault-tolerant objects from faulty clients
that access them.
1.1 Summary of the Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
. we present a new computing model where shared
memory objects are protected by fine-grained access
policies;
. we present a new shared memory object, the PEATS;
. we show the benefits of this model by providing
simple and efficient consensus algorithms with
resilience n   3t þ 1, and we prove that this is the
optimal resilience for strong binary consensus in our
system model; our strong binary consensus algo-
rithm uses only Oððn þ tÞlognÞ bits as compared to
the ðn þ 1Þ 2tþ1
t

sticky bits of the algorithm in [9];
. we show also how the PEATS can be used to solve
multivalued strong consensus and default multi-
valued consensus in our model;
. we prove that PEATS are universal [18], i.e., that they
can be used to implement any other shared memory
object, by providing two universal constructions
based on PEATS: a uniform lock-free construction
and a wait-free construction. The wait-free construc-
tion is the first for a model in which the memory is
shared by Byzantine processes (there is only one
previous universal construction for this case and it is
t-resilient, not wait-free [11]).
1.2 Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
system model and the augmented tuple space. PEOs are
presented in Section 3. Some details about the feasibility of
the PEATS are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
consensus algorithms based on this object. Section 6
provides the two universal constructions based on a PEATS
object. Finally, Sections 7 and 8 summarize related work
and present conclusions.
2M ODEL AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 System Model
The model of computation consists of an asynchronous set
of n processes P¼f p1;p 2;...;p ng that communicate via a
set of k shared memory objects O¼f o1;...;o kg (e.g.,
registers, sticky bits, and tuple spaces). Each of these
processes may be either faulty or correct. A correct process is
constrained to obey its specification, while a faulty process,
also called a Byzantine process [7], can deviate arbitrarily
from it. In the same way as previous works on Byzantine
shared memory [9], [10], [11], we assume that a malicious
process cannot impersonate a correct process when invok-
ing an operation on a shared memory object. This limitation
is important in our model since we will use a reference
monitor [19] to enforce the access policy (see Section 4). This
monitor must know the correct identity of the process
invoking operations on the object in order to grant or deny
access for the invocation. It is worth to notice that without
authenticated access to shared memory, it is impossible to
implement access control, and thus, it is impossible to solve
any nontrivial problem in the Byzantine asynchronous
setting since a faulty process can always write invalid/
inconsistent values to the memory.
A configuration of a shared memory distributed system
with n processes communicating using k shared memory
objects is a vector C ¼h q1;...;q n;r 1;...;r ki, where qi is the
state of the process pi and ri is the state of the object oi.A
step of a process is an action of this process that changes the
system configuration (the state of a process and/or object).
An execution of a distributed system is an infinite sequence
C0, a0, C1, a1, ..., where C0 is an initial configuration and
each ai is the step that changes the system state from Ci
to Ciþ1.
Each shared memory object is accessed through a set of
operations made available through its interface. An object
operation is executed by a process when it makes an
invocation to that operation. An operation ends when the
process receives a reply for the corresponding invocation.
An operation that has been invoked but not replied to is
called a pending operation. We assume that all processes
(even the faulty ones) invoke an operation on a shared
memory object only after receiving the reply for their last
operation on this object. This condition is sometimes called
well formedness or correct interaction [17].
1
The shared memory objects used in this paper are
assumed to be dependable (they do not deviate from their
specification) and to satisfy the linearizability correctness
condition [20]: although they are accessed concurrently,
every operation executed on them appears to take effect
instantaneously at some point between its invocation and
reply, in such a way that concurrent operations appear to be
executed sequentially.
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1. This is just a simplification to improve the presentation of the
algorithms. The enforcement of this assumption can be easily implemented
making the objects ignore invocations made by processes that have pending
invocations.2.2 Termination Conditions
In terms of liveness, all operations provided by the shared
memory objects used in this paper satisfy one of the
following termination conditions (x is a shared memory
object):
. lock-freedom: an operation x:op is lock-free if, when
invoked by a correct process at any point in an
execution in which there are pending operations
invoked by correct processes, some operation (either
x:op or any of the pending operations) will be
completed;
. t-resilience [11]: an operation x:op is t-resilient if,
when executed by a correct process, it eventually
completes in any execution in which at least n   t
correct processes infinitely often have a pending
invocation for some operation of x;
. t-threshold [11]: an operation x:op is t-threshold if,
when executed by a correct process, it eventually
completes in any execution in which at least n   t
correct processes invoke x:op; and
. wait-freedom [18]: an operation x:op is wait-free if,
when executed by a correct process, it eventually
completes in any execution (despite the failure of
other processes).
The main difference between t-threshold and t-resilience
is the fact that 1) an operation is guaranteed to complete
only if n   t correct processes invoke the same operation and
2) an operation completes only if n   t correct processes
keep invoking some operation on the object. Notice that
t-threshold implies t-resilience, but not vice-versa.
For any of these liveness conditions, we say that an object
satisfies the condition if all its operations satisfy the
condition.
2.3 Augmented Tuple Space
The tuple space coordination model, originally introduced in
the LINDA programming language [16], allows distributed
processes to interact through a shared memory object called
a tuple space, where generic data structures called tuples are
stored and retrieved.
Each tuple is a sequence of typed fields. A tuple in which
all fields have their values defined is called an entry. A tuple
that has one or more fields with undefined values is called a
template (indicated by a bar, e.g., t). An undefined value can
be represented by the wildcard symbol “ ” (meaning “any
value”) or by a formal field, denoted by a variable name
preceded by the character “?” (e.g., ?v).
The type of a tuple t is the sequence of types of each field
of t. An entry t and a template t match, denoted mðt;tÞ, iff 1)
they have the same type and 2) all defined field values of t
are equal to the corresponding field values of t. The variable
in a formal field (e.g., v in ?v) is set to the value in the
corresponding field of the entry matched to the template.
There are three basic operations on a tuple space [16]:
outðtÞ, which outputs the entry t in the tuple space (write);
inðtÞ, which removes a tuple that matches t from the tuple
space (destructive read); and rdðtÞ, which is similar to inðtÞ
but does not remove the tuple from the space (nondestruc-
tive read). The in and rd operations are blocking, i.e., if
there is no tuple in the space that matches the specified
template, the invoking process will wait until a matching
tuple becomes available.
A common extension to this model, which we adopt in
this paper, is the inclusion of nonblocking variants of these
read operations, called inp and rdp, respectively. These
operations work in the same way as their blocking versions
but return even if there is no matching tuple for the
specified template in the space (signaling the operation’s
result with a Boolean value). Notice that, according to the
definitions above, the tuple space works just like an
associative memory: tuples are accessed through their
contents, not using addresses. This feature leads to a simple
programming model where more expressive interactions
can be described with very few lines of code.
In Herlihy’s hierarchy of shared memory objects [18], the
tuple space object has consensus number 2 [15], i.e., it can
be used to solve consensus between at most two processes.
In this paper, we want to present algorithms to solve
consensus and build universal constructions for any
number of processes; therefore, we need universal shared
memory objects (consensus number n) [18], [17]. Therefore,
we use an augmented tuple space [14], [15] which provides an
extra conditional atomic swap operation. This operation,
denoted by casðt;tÞ for a template t and an entry t, works
like an atomic (indivisible) execution of the instruction:
if :rdpðtÞ then outðtÞ:
The meaning of this instruction is “if the reading of t
fails, insert the entry t in the space.”
2 This operation returns
true—we say it succeeded—if the tuple is inserted in the
space, and false otherwise. The augmented tuple space is a
universal shared memory object, since it can solve wait-free
consensus trivially in the crash fault model [14], [15] as well
as in the Byzantine model (as will show in this paper) for
any number of processes.
All algorithms proposed in this paper are based on a
single linearizable wait-free augmented tuple space.
3P OLICY-ENFORCED OBJECTS
Previous works on objects shared by Byzantine processes
consider that the access to operations in these objects is
protected by ACLs [9], [10], [11]. In that model, each
operation provided by an object is associated to a list of
processes that have access to that operation. Only processes
that have access to an operation can execute it. This model
requires a kind of reference monitor [19] to protect the
objects from unauthorized access. The implementation of
this monitor is not problematic since, in general, it is
assumed that the shared memory objects are implemented
using replicated servers [1], [2], [3], [4], [6], [8], which have
processing power.
In this paper, we also assume this kind of implementa-
tion but extend the notion of protection to more powerful
security polices than access control based on ACLs. We
define PEOs, which are objects whose access is governed by
a fine-grained security policy. Later, we argue that the use
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2. Notice that the meaning of the tuple space cas is the opposite of the
well-known register compare&swap operation [17], where the object state is
modified if its current state is equal to the value compared.of these policies makes possible the implementation of
simple and efficient algorithms that solve several important
distributed problems, for instance, consensus.
A reference monitor permits the execution of an
operation on a PEO if the corresponding invocation satisfies
the access policy of the object. The access policy is composed
by a set of rules. Each rule is composed by an invocation
pattern and a logical expression. An execution is allowed
(predicate executeðopÞ set to true) only if its associated
logical expression is satisfied by the invocation pattern.
Following the principle of fail-safe defaults, any invocation
that does not fit in any rule is always denied [21]. A logical
value false is returned by the operation whenever the
access is denied.
The reference monitor has access to three pieces of
information in order to evaluate if an invocation
invokeðp;opÞ to a protected object x can be executed:
. the invoker process identifier p;
. the operation op and its arguments; and
. the current state of x.
An example of a PEO is a policy-enforced numeric
atomic register r in which only values greater than the
current value can be written and in which only processes p1,
p2, and p3 can write. The access policy for that PEO is
represented in Fig. 1. We use the symbol :- taken from the
PROLOG programming language to state that the predicate
in the left-hand side is true if the condition in the right-hand
side is true. The execute predicate (left-hand side) indicates
if the operation is to be executed, and the predicate invoke
(right-hand side) indicates if the operation was invoked.
In the access policy in Fig. 1, we initially define the
elements of the object’s state that can be used in the rules. In
this case, the register state is specified by its current value,
denoted r. Then, one or more access rules are defined. The
first rule ðRreadÞ says that all register readings are allowed.
The second rule ðRwriteÞ states that a writeðvÞ operation
invoked by a process p, can only be executed if 1) p is one of
the processes in the set fp1;p 2;p 3g and 2) the value v being
written is greater than the current value of the register r.
Notice that condition 1 is nothing more than a straightfor-
ward implementation of an ACL in our model.
4P OLICY-ENFORCED AUGMENTED TUPLE SPACE
The algorithms presented in this paper are based on a
PEATS object. The implementation of this kind of object (or
another PEO in general) on distributed message-passing
systems could be based on interceptors [22], that would
grant or deny access to the operations according to the
access policy defined for the tuple space and the identity of
the client, which is available due to the use of authenticated
channels (implemented using standard technologies like
IPSec or SSL). A straightforward resilient implementation
would be to replicate the PEATS in a set of servers, e.g.,
using the CL-BFT library [3] or any other Byzantine fault-
tolerant state machine replication support [23]. The inter-
ceptor would be deployed in every PEATS replica to make
possible the local enforcement of policies, working as a
reference monitor. The access policy could be hard-coded in
the interceptor, or a more generic policy enforcer system
like the one presented in [24] might be used. Fig. 2
illustrates this design.
In this figure, it can be seen that the set of processes that
access the fault-tolerant replicated PEATS do it using a
replica coordination protocol which ensures that all
requests are executed in all PEATS replicas in the same
order (usually through an atomic multicast protocol, which
is known to be equivalent to consensus [25]). This, together
with the fact that both the augmented tuple space and the
reference monitor are deterministic objects (i.e., their out-
puts depend only on their previous state and the operation
issued by the client), basic voting protocols can be executed
by the processes to determine the operation results. The
DEPSPACE system [26] is a complete implementation of a
PEATS that follows the architecture described in Fig. 2.
It is worth to notice that any fault-tolerant implementa-
tion of a PEATS requires consensus for replica coordination
simply because this object has consensus number greater
than one. Otherwise, the FLP result [27] would not be valid:
a distributed system that would solve consensus in
asynchronous systems (the PEATS fault-tolerant implemen-
tation) would be built without solving consensus. Given
this note, a question that can be made is—why build
synchronization algorithms based on fault-tolerant objects
built using other synchronization algorithms? There are two
answers for this question, a theoretical and a practical one.
The theoretical one is that, in this paper, as well as in the
previous ones in this field [11], [9], consensus and universal
constructions are used as reference problems to determine
the power of the model and objects used to solve it. The
practical answer is that, for many applications, it is much
simpler to develop a resilient object/service built on top of a
fixed set of “controlled” servers, and make this object
available to be used by an open and unknown set of
processes that need to coordinate between themselves.
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Fig. 1. An example of access policy for an atomic register.
Fig. 2. A Byzantine fault-tolerant PEATS implementation.5S OLVING CONSENSUS
In this section, we illustrate the benefits of using a PEATS to
solve several variants of the consensus problem.
The consensus problem concerns a set of n processes
proposing values from a set V of possible values and trying
to reach agreement about a single decision value. A
consensus object is a shared memory object that encapsu-
lates a consensus algorithm. Next, we present algorithms to
implement three kinds of consensus objects (or, to solve
three consensus variants):
. Weak consensus [11]. A weak consensus object x is a
shared memory object with a single operation
x:proposeðvÞ, with v 2V , satisfying the properties:
(Agreement) in any execution, x:propose returns the
same value, called the consensus value, to every
correct process that invokes it; (Validity) in any finite
execution in which all participating processes are
correct, if the consensus value is v, then some
process invoked x:proposeðvÞ.
. Strong consensus [11]. A strong consensus object x is
defined by a stronger Validity condition than weak
consensus objects: (Strong Validity) if the consensus
value is v,t h e ns o m ecorrect process invoked
x:proposeðvÞ.
Another variant of consensus that we define and
implement in this paper is the default (multivalued)
consensus [5], which is a slightly weakened version of
strong consensus:
. Default consensus. A default consensus object x is
defined by a weaker Validity condition than strong
consensus objects: (Default Strong Validity). The
consensus value must satisfy two conditions: 1) if
all correct processes invoke x:proposeðvÞ, then v is
the consensus value and 2) if the consensus value
is v, then some correct process invoked x:proposeðvÞ
or v ¼?.
The idea behind default consensus is that the consensus
value should be a value proposed by some correct process
or a default value ? = 2V [5]. This idea is related to the
quittable consensus problem [28]. In this problem, a process
can decide a “quit” value ðQÞ when some failure is detected.
In the default consensus problem, the default value ð?Þ can
be decided even in executions without faulty processes if
not enough processes propose the same value.
We remark that all these objects, as all other objects used
in this paper, must satisfy some of the termination
conditions given in Section 2.2.
5.1 Weak Consensus
In a weak consensus object, the consensus value can be any
of the proposed values. With this validity condition, it is
perfectly legal that a value proposed by a faulty process
becomes the consensus value.
Algorithm 1: Weak Byzantine consensus object (process pi).
Shared variables:
1: ts ¼; {PEATS object}
procedure x:proposeðvÞ
2: if ts:casðhDECISION;?di;hDECISION;viÞ then
3: d   v {decision value v inserted}
4: end if
5: return d
Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm that implements
weak consensus using a PEATS. The algorithm is very
simple: a process tries to insert its proposal in the PEATS
object using the cas operation. It succeeds only if there is no
decision tuple in the space. If there is already a decision
tuple, this is the value to be decided and returned. In the
former case, line 3 is executed, setting variable d to the
decision value, while in the latter, it is the cas operation that
sets d.
The access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 1 is
presented in Fig. 3. The predicate formalðxÞ is true if x is a
formal field; otherwise, it is false. This access policy
permits only executions of the cas operation. The tuple
must have two fields—the first with a constant DECISION
and the second must be formal. Only one decision tuple can
be inserted in the PEATS.
Besides its simplicity and elegance, this algorithm has
several interesting properties: First, it is uniform [17], i.e., it
works for any number of processes and the processes do not
need to know how many other processes are participating
in the distributed computation. Second, it can solve multi-
valued consensus, since the range of values proposed can be
arbitrary. Finally, the algorithm is wait-free, i.e., it always
terminates despite the occurrence of failures of any number
of processes running it.
An interesting point about this algorithm is that our
PEATS with the access policy specified in Fig. 3 behaves like
a persistent object, so our result is in accordance with [11,
Theorem 4.1].
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 provides a wait-free weak consensus
object.
Proof. From the access policy, we know that the only way to
insert a tuple in the space is by invoking the cas
operation. This operation can be executed successfully
only once since there is no way to remove a tuple from
the space (operations in and inp are not allowed). This
way, the Agreement property must be satisfied since the
first process that successfully executes the cas operation
will insert a DECISION tuple with its consensus value v
in the space. Other processes will read v (through the
formal field ?d) since their invocation of the cas operation
will return false (the DECISION tuple will not be
inserted in the space).
The Validity property holds because, in any execution
with only correct processes, the consensus value must
have been proposed by some process (the one that
inserted the DECISION tuple with its proposal in the
s p a c e ) .T h ea l g o r i t h mi sw a i t - f r e eb e c a u s et h ecas
operation is wait-free. t u
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Fig. 3. Access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 1.5.2 Strong Consensus
A strong consensus object enforces the validity condition by
requiring that the consensus value be proposed by a correct
process even in the presence of faulty ones. This strict
condition results in a more complex (but still simple)
algorithm. However, this algorithm does not share some of
the benefits of the algorithm presented in the previous
section:
. Nonuniform. The strong consensus algorithm is not
uniform since a process has to know who are the
other processes in order to read their input values
and decide a consensus value proposed by some
correct process.
. Binary consensus. Our algorithm solves only binary
consensus. This limitation is also due to the fact that
a process needs to know if a value has been
proposed by one correct process before deciding it.
. t-threshold object. The algorithm for strong consen-
sus is not wait-free since it requires n   t processes
to take part in the algorithm. However, the number
of processes needed in our algorithm is optimal: n  
3t þ 1 (see Corollary 1 in the next section).
Algorithm 2: Strong Byzantine consensus object (process pi).
Shared variables:
1: ts ¼; {PEATS object}
procedure x:proposeðvÞ
2: ts:outðhPROPOSE;p i;viÞ
3: S0  ; {set of processes that proposed 0}
4: S1  ; {set of processes that proposed 1}
5: while jS0j <tþ 1 ^j S1j <tþ 1 do
6: for all pj 2Pnð S0 [ S1Þ do
7: if ts:rdpðhPROPOSE;p j;?viÞ then
8: Sv   Sv [f pjg {pj proposed v}
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: if ts:casðhDECISION;?d; i;hDECISION;v;S viÞ then
13: d   v {decision value ðvÞ inserted}
14: end if
15: return d
Algorithm 2 presents the strong binary consensus
protocol. The algorithm works as follows: a process pi first
inserts its proposal in the augmented tuple space ts using a
PROPOSE tuple (line 2). Then, pi queries ts continuously
trying to read proposals (line 7) until it finds that some
value has been proposed by at least t þ 1 processes (loop of
lines 5-11). The rationale for the amount of t þ 1 is that at
least one correct process must have proposed this value,
since there are at most t failed processes. The first value that
satisfies this condition is then inserted in the tuple space
using the cas operation. This commitment phase is
important since different processes can collect t þ 1 propo-
sals for different values and we must ensure that a single
decision value will be defined. All further invocations of cas
return this value (lines 12-14).
The access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 2 is
presented in Fig. 4. This access policy specifies that any
process can read any tuple, that each process can introduce
only one PROPOSE entry in the space, that the second field
of the template used in the cas operation must be a formal
field, and that the decision value v must appear in proposals
of at least t þ 1 processes. These simple rules that could
easily be implemented in practice effectively constrain the
power of Byzantine processes, thus allowing the simplicity
of the consensus presented in Algorithm 2.
Our algorithm requires only nðdlogneþ1Þþð1þðtþ1Þ
dlogneÞ bits in the PEATS object
3 (n PROPOSE tuples plus
one DECISION tuple). The consensus algorithm with the
same resilience presented in [9] requires ðn þ 1Þ 2tþ1
t

sticky bits.
4
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 provides a t-threshold strong binary
consensus object if n   3t þ 1.
Proof. From the access policy, we know that the only way to
insert a DECISION tuple in the space is by invoking a cas
operation. This operation can be invoked successfully
(returning true) only once, since neither an inserted tuple
can be removed (the operations in and inp are not
allowed by the policy), nor two decision tuples can be
inserted (the second field of the template of cas must be
formal). In any execution of the algorithm, the first
process that executes cas after reading t þ 1 PROPOSE
tuples with the same value v will manage to insert a
DECISION tuple with v (if it satisfies the rule Rcas), thus
making this the decision value (lines 13 and 15). The
Agreement property is always satisfied since the value v
associated with the DECISION tuple in the space will be
read by all correct processes that do not succeed in the
cas operation, i.e., all that receive false in reply. Their
decision values will be v (lines 12 and 15).
The algorithm satisfies also Strong Validity since the
DECISION tuple can only be inserted if its value v is
justified by a set of t þ 1 processes (at least one correct)
that proposed v. This condition is enforced by the rule
Rcas of the access policy.
In terms of termination conditions, our algorithm is a
t-threshold protocol. This property is satisfied since for a
process to decide a value v, this value must have been
proposed by t þ 1 processes. Assuming n   3t þ 1, it can
be easily shown that if n   t correct processes (at least
2t þ 1) invoke x:propose with some value v0 2f 0;1g,
there will be always at least t þ 1 PROPOSE tuples for
some value (0 or 1) and one process will insert a justified
DECISION tuple in the space. Since the cas operation is
wait-free, the algorithm terminates. t u
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3. For example, only 68 bits are needed for t ¼ 4 and n ¼ 13.
4. It is a lot of memory. For example, if we want to tolerate t ¼ 4 faulty
processes, we need at least n ¼ 13 processes and 1, 764 sticky bits.
Fig. 4. Access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 2.5.3 Strong Multivalued Consensus
A strong multivalued consensus can be obtained with little
modifications to the strong binary consensus algorithm
following the same ideas in [9]. In fact, if we consider a k-
valued consensus problem, in which there are k possible
inputs for processes to propose,
5 i.e., jVj ¼ k (binary
consensus is a 2-valued consensus), we can use the same
algorithm and collect different proposition values in
different sets Sv, with v 2V and jVj ¼ k. The algorithm
works exactly in the same way as Algorithm 2: a process
proposes its value and keeps reading the values of other
processes until there is some value that was proposed by
t þ 1 processes (some correct process proposed it). This
value will be assumed as a possible decision.
Unfortunately, this algorithm requires more processes to
resist t faulty processes, as shown by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The algorithm implements a t-threshold strong
k-valued consensus object if n  ð k þ 1Þt þ 1.
Proof. The proofs for Agreement and Validity are similar to
the proof of Theorem 2. Now, suppose the worst possible
execution for a system running the algorithm described
above: each of the k possible values is proposed by t
processes and t faulty processes do not propose (they
crash or stay silent during the whole execution). To
guarantee the termination of the algorithm, we need one
process to break the tie of t proposals for each value.
Consequently, we need n   kt þ t þ 1 ¼ð k þ 1Þt þ 1. t u
A direct consequence of this theorem is that the number
of processes needed to solve strong k-valued consensus in
the presence of Byzantine faults using the described
algorithm is always n>k . This result rules out the
possibility of using this algorithm in applications where
every process must propose some process identifier to a
consensus. Examples of such applications are consensus-
based mutual exclusion [8] and leader-election [17].
Our strong multivalued consensus algorithm requires
only Oðnðlogn þ logjVjÞÞ bits of shared memory.
The following theorem proves that n  ð k þ 1Þt þ 1 is the
minimum number of processes needed to solve the k-valued
strong consensus problem tolerating t Byzantine faults.
Theorem 4. The k-valued strong consensus problem can only be
solved in an asynchronous system in which the processes
communicate through PEOs and at most t processes can be
faulty if the number of processes is n  ð k þ 1Þt þ 1.
Proof. Theorem 3 proves the existence of an algorithm with
this resilience. We have to prove now that there is no
algorithm that solves the k-valued strong consensus
problem with n  ð k þ 1Þt. Assume that there is an
algorithm A that solves this problem with this number of
processes. We will present an execution in which A does
not terminate.
Let V¼f v1;...;v kg be the domain of k values.
Suppose an execution   of A in which no faulty process
participates in the distributed computation (t processes
stay silent) and each of the k values of V is proposed by
at most t correct processes.
Independently of the shared memory object(s) used
by A and their access policy(s), to satisfy the strong
consensus Validity property, a correct process can only
consider a value for decision if it knows that this value
was proposed by at least t þ 1 processes. If this condition
is not true, it is very easy to show an execution of A in
which a correct process will decide a value proposed
only by faulty processes (due to the system absence of
synchrony), violating the Validity property.
Turning back to the execution  , the system will reach
a configuration in which all correct processes will have
read at most t proposals for each one of the k values and
cannot read more proposals (there are no more processes,
since all correct processes—at most kt—already proposed
and the t faulty ones will stay silent). Consequently, no
value will be proposed by at least t þ 1 processes and the
algorithm will not terminate. This means that there
cannot be an algorithm A that solves the k-valued strong
consensus problem with n  ð k þ 1Þt. t u
Given this theorem, we can define the optimal resilience
for strong binary consensus.
Corollary 1. The optimal resilience for the strong binary
consensus problem in asynchronous systems where the
processes communicate using PEOs is t ¼b n 1
3 c of n processes.
Proof. The proof that such algorithm exists is given by
Theorem 2. The proof that this resilience is optimal is a
direct consequence of Theorem 4 if we take k ¼ 2. t u
5.4 Default Multivalued Consensus
A default multivalued consensus object can be obtained by
making some simple modifications to the strong binary
consensus in Algorithm 2. The objective here is to show that
a PEATS allows to solve multivalued consensus stronger
than weak consensus with optimal resilience, i.e., with
n   3t þ 1.
The required modifications to Algorithm 2 are the
following:
. There has to be one set Sv for every different value v
in a tuple hPROPOSE; ;vi obtained from the PEATS
in line 7 (instead of only S0 and S1).
. After a process reads n   t proposed values, if there
is no value v proposed by at least t þ 1 processes, the
value to be put in the DECISION tuple is ? .
. If the value put in the DECISION tuple is ? , the
third field in the DECISION tuple has to be a set
with all the sets Sv filled in line 8.
In order to rule out the possibility of malicious processes
forcingtheconsensusvaluetobealways? ,wehavetoensure
that the default value is put in the PEATS (using cas)b ya
process p only if this process has read n   t PROPOSE tuples
andnoneof thevalueswasproposed byt þ 1 processes.This
condition is enforced by the access policy in Fig. 5.
Therearetwomaindifferencesbetweenthispolicyandthe
one used for strong consensus (see Fig. 4). First, all proposed
values must be different from ? (rule Rout). Second, the rule
Rcas nowstates thatifpwantstooutputaDECISIONtuplein
the PEATS with v ¼? , it has to show that it did not find a
value proposed by t þ 1 processes. More precisely, the rule
states that if the second argument of the cas operation
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5. This problem is completely different from the well-known k-set
consensus, where the consensus value of the processes can be different, but
belonging to a set of k values [29].executedbyp(Algorithm2,line12)takesv ¼? ,thenthethird
argument has to contain a set of sets Sv satisfying the
followingconditions:1)theunionofallsetsSv mustcontainat
least n   t processes, 2) no set Sv can have more than
t processes, and 3) all processes q in all sets Sv must
correspond to a PROPOSE tuple hPROPOSE;q;vi in TS.
Theorem 5. The algorithm implements a t-threshold default
multivalued consensus object if n   3t þ 1.
Proof. The Agreement property is satisfied due to the access
policy in Fig. 5 that does not allow two different
DECISION tuples to be inserted in the space. The two
conditions of the Default Strong Validity property are
also satisfied:
1. If all correct processes invoke x:proposeðvÞ with
the same value v, then a different value v0 can be
proposed by at most other t processes, and
clearly, the cas operation of the PEATS will not
allow the insertion of a DECISION tuple with v0.
A malicious process will also not be allowed to
insert a DECISION tuple with ? due to the last
two lines of the rule Rcas.
2. If a value v 6¼? is decided, it must have been
proposed by at least t þ 1 processes (one of which
is correct). t u
6U NIVERSAL CONSTRUCTIONS
A fundamental problem in shared memory distributed
computing is to find out if an object X can be used to
implement (or emulate) another object Y. This section proves
that PEATS are universal objects [18], i.e., that they can be
used to emulate any other shared memory object. Herlihy
has shown that an object is universal in a system with n
processes if and only if it has consensus number n, i.e., if it
can solve consensus for n processes [18].
The proof that PEATS are universal is made by providing
two universal constructions based on this kind of object. A
universal construction is an algorithm that uses one or more
universal objects to emulate any other shared memory object
[18]. There are several wait-free universal constructions for
thecrashfaultmodel,usingconsensusobjects[18],stickybits
[13], compare and swap registers [17], and several other
universal objects. A universal construction for the Byzantine
fault model using sticky bits was defined in [11]. However,
this construction is not wait-free but only t-resilient.
In order to define a universal construction that
emulates a deterministic object o, we have to start by
defining the type of the object. A type T is defined by the
tuple hSTATET;S T;INVOKET;REPLY T;applyTi, where
STATET is the set of possible states of objects of type T,
ST 2 STATET is the initial state for objects of this type,
INVOKET is the set of possible invocations of operations
provided by objects of type T, REPLYT is the set of
possible replies for these invocations, and applyT is a
function defined as
applyT : STATET   INVOKET ! STATET   REPLYT:
The function applyT represents the state transitions of the
object. Given a state Si and an invocation inv, applyTðSi;invÞ
gives a new state Sj (the result of the execution of inv in
state Si) and a reply reply for the invocation. This definition
is enough for showing the universality of tuple spaces,
although Malkhi et al. have shown that a simple general-
ization is needed for emulating nondeterministic types and
some objects that satisfy weak liveness guarantees [11].
In this section, we present a simple nonblocking
universal construction, which shows the power and
simplicity of our PEATS objects. Then, we present a wait-
free universal construction.
6.1 Uniform Lock-Free Universal Construction
Our lock-free universal construction follows previous con-
structions [17], [18]. The idea is to make all correct processes
execute the sequence of operations invoked in the emulated
object in the same order. Each process keeps a replica of the
state of the emulated object Si. An invocation inv is executed
by applying the function applyTðSi;invÞ to that state. The
problem essentially boils down to the definition of a total
order for the execution of the operations.
The operations to be executed in the emulated object can
be invoked in any of the processes, so the definition of an
order for the operations requires a consensus among all
processes. Therefore, we need an object with consensus
number n, i.e., a universal object.
The solution is to add—to thread—the operations to be
executed in the emulated object to a list where each element
has a sequence number. The element with the greater
sequencenumberrepresentsthelastoperationtobeexecuted
on the emulated object. The consistency of the list, i.e., the
propertythateachofitselements(eachoperation)isfollowed
by one other element, is guaranteed by the universal object, a
PEATS in our case. Given this list, each process executes the
operations of the object emulated in the same order.
The list of operations is implemented using a PEATS
object. The key idea is to represent each operation as a SEQ
tuple containing a position field, and to insert each of these
tuples in the space using the cas operation. When a process
wants to execute an operation, it invokes the cas operation:
if there is no SEQ tuple with the specified sequence number
in the space, then the tuple is inserted. Fig. 6 illustrates the
main idea.
In this figure, the process p1 tries to thread a tuple
containing an invocation inv1 with sequence number 3 in
the PEATS, while process p2 executes cas trying to insert an
invocationinv2withsequencenumber5.InthePEATS,there
are tuples with sequence numbers from 1 to 4, so process p1
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Fig. 5. Access policy for the PEATS used in the default multivalued
consensus.will not insert its tuple and process p2 will have success in its
insertion. Algorithm 3 presents this universal object.
Algorithm 3: Lock-free universal construction (process pi).
Shared variables:
1: ts ¼; {PEATS object}
Local variables:
2: state ¼ ST {current state of the object}
3: pos ¼ 0 {position of the tail of the operations’ list}
invoked inv
4: loop
5: pos   pos þ 1
6: if ts:casðhSEQ;pos;?einvi;hSEQ;pos;inviÞ then
7: hstate;replyi applyTðstate;invÞ
8: return reply
9: end if
10: hstate;replyi applyTðstate;einvÞ
11: end loop
The algorithm assumes that each process pi begins its
execution with an initial state composed by the initial state
of the emulated object (state ¼ ST, line 2) plus an empty list
(pos ¼ 0, line 3). When an operation is invoked (denoted by
inv), pi iterates through the list updating the state variable
(loop in lines 4-11) and trying to thread its operation by
appending it to the end of the list using the cas operation
(line 6). If cas is executed successfully by pi, the state
variable is updated and the reply to the invocation is
returned (lines 7 and 8).
The algorithm is lock-free due to the cas operation: when
two processes try concurrently to put tuples at the end of
the list, at least one of them succeeds. However, the
algorithm is not wait-free since some processes might
succeed in threading their operations again and again,
delaying other processes forever. A very interesting prop-
erty of this algorithm is that it is uniform: processes
executing operations on the emulated object do not need
to know each other. This means that this algorithm works
even with an unknown and dynamic set of processes.
The access policy for our universal construction (Fig. 7)
states that a SEQ tuple with the second field pos can only be
insertedinthespace(usingcas)ifthereisaSEQtuplewiththe
second field with value pos   1. No other operations are
allowed.
The proof of the correctness of the algorithm is based on
the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. For any execution of the system, the following
properties are invariants of the PEATS used in Algorithm 3:
1. For any pos   1, there is at most one tuple
hSEQ;pos;invi in the tuple space.
2. For any tuple hSEQ;pos;invi in the tuple space with
pos > 1, there is exactly one tuple hSEQ;pos   1;invi
in the space.
Proof. ThesetwoinvariantsfollowdirectlyfromAlgorithm3
and its access policy (Fig. 7):
1. From the access policy, we can see that a tuple can
be inserted in the space only by a cas operation,
which is executed with a template and an entry
with the same sequence number pos, and with a
template invocation field ðxÞ that is formal. With
that property and the behavior of the cas
operation, it becomes clear that there can never
be two SEQ tuples with the same sequence
number in the tuple space.
2. From the access policy, it is possible to see that a
cas operation can be executed by trying to insert a
tuple in position pos only if there is a SEQ tuple in
the space with position pos   1. This guarantees
that there is one tuple hSEQ;pos   1;invi in the
space. That there is no more than one is a direct
consequence of the first part of the lemma. t u
Lemma 2. The universal construction of the Algorithm 3 is
lock-free.
Proof. This lemma is proved by contradiction. Let   be an
execution with only two correct processes p1 and p2
(without loss of generality) that invoke operations inv1
and inv2, respectively. Suppose that they stay halted
forever, not receiving replies. We have to show that  
does not exist. An inspection of the algorithm shows that
the processes keep updating their copies of the object
state until they execute the most recent threaded
operation (with position field value equal to pos, without
loss of generality). At this point, p1 and p2 will try to
thread their invocations to the list in position pos þ 1
executing cas (line 6). Since the PEATS is assumed to be
linearizable, the two cas invocations will happen one
after another in some order, so either the inv1 or the inv2
SEQ tuples will be inserted in position pos þ 1. The
process that succeeds in executing cas will thread its
invocation and will return its reply (lines 7 and 8). This is
a contradiction with the definition of  . t u
Theorem 6. Algorithm 3 provides a lock-free universal
construction.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that there is a total order on the
operations executed in the emulated object. Through an
inspection of the algorithm, it is easy to see that a process
updates its copy of the state of the emulated object by
applying the deterministic function applyT to all SEQ
tuplesintheorderdefinedbythesequencenumber.Inthis
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Fig. 6. PEATS-based universal construction.
Fig. 7. Access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 3.way, all operations are executed in the same order by all
correct processes, and this order is according to the
sequential specification of the object provided by the
functionapplyT.Thissufficesforprovingthattheuniversal
construction satisfies linearizability. Lemma 2 proves that
the construction is lock-free. t u
6.2 Wait-Free Universal Construction
The wait-free universal construction follows the same basic
idea as the previous construction of building a list of
operations to be executed in the emulated object. However,
here, we need a helping mechanism that allows a process to
thread an operation even if in contention with n   1 faulty
processes. This mechanism works as follows: When a
process wants to thread an operation, it inserts an ANN
(announcement) tuple with the invocation it wants to
execute on the emulated object. After this insertion, the
invocation is said to be announced. For each position of the
invocation list, there is a preferred process for the position.
The preferred process for position pos is pi such that
i ¼ pos mod n. If the preferred process for a position has an
invocation that is announced but not threaded, then the
policy of the space does not permit any other invocation to
be threaded in that position. The invocation can be threaded
either by the process or by any other process willing to
“help” it. A consequence of the use of this mechanism is
that the algorithm is not uniform: processes must be aware
of the ID of each other in order to help.
Algorithm 4 presents this universal construction. For
simplicity, it assumes there are no two identical invocations,
something that can be trivially enforced by adding a unique
timestamp to the invocation (including the invoker’s
identification).
Algorithm 4: Wait-free universal construction (process pi).
Shared variables:
1: ts ¼; {PEATS object}
Local variables:
2: state ¼ ST {current state of the object}
3: pos ¼ 0 {position of the tail of the operations’ list}
invoked inv
4: ts:outðhANN;i;inviÞ
5: repeat
6: pos   pos þ 1
7: preferred   pos mod n
8: if :ts:rdpðhSEQ;pos;?einviÞ then
9: if ði6¼preferredÞ^ts:rdpðhANN;preferred;?tinviÞ
then
10: if ts:rdpðhSEQ; ;tinviÞ then
11: tinv   inv
12: end if
13: else
14: tinv   inv
15: end if
16: if ts:casðhSEQ;pos;?einvi;hSEQ;pos;tinviÞ then
17: einv   tinv
18: end if
19: end if
20: hstate;replyi applyTðstate;einvÞ
21: until einv ¼ inv
22: ts:inpðhANN;i;inviÞ
23: return reply
Each process pi begins its execution with the initial state
of the emulated object (state ¼ ST, line 2) and an empty
list (pos ¼ 0, line 3). When an operation (denoted by inv)i s
invoked on the emulated object, pi first announces its
invocation with an ANN tuple and then iterates through
the list updating its state variable and trying to thread inv
(lines 5-21). When inv is executed ðeinv ¼ invÞ, pi removes
the announcement tuple from the PEATS and returns the
reply for the invocation (lines 20-23).
The most important part of the algorithm is the loop in
lines 5-21. This loop has two main parts: the verification if
the preferred process needs help (lines 8-15) and the
threading of an invocation (lines 16-18). The main idea is
to find an invocation to be threaded (stored in variable tinv)
and try to insert it in the PEATS in a SEQ tuple. The
invocation to be executed is stored in variable einv. The two
parts of the loop are executed for some position pos only if
this position is not already occupied (line 8). Otherwise, the
invocation for this position is read and executed, updating
the state of the emulated object (line 20).
The “help” part of the loop works as follows: If there is
an ANN tuple from the preferred process for position pos
(line 9, second condition) that is not already threaded
(line 10), then the invocation tinv in the ANN tuple must
be threaded in that position (line 11). Otherwise, inv can
be threaded (line 14). Notice that pi verifies if some
process needs help only if it is not the preferred process
for position pos (first condition of line 9). The operation is
threaded using a cas: if there is no SEQ tuple in the
position, then einv is inserted in a SEQ tuple.
The access policy for this universal construction is
responsible for ensuring that the total order of the list is
always satisfied and the helping mechanism is respected.
This policy is presented in Fig. 8.
The policy is an extension of the policy of the lock-free
universal construction (see Fig. 7). There are now two
simple rules to allow the insertion and removal of ANN
tuples ðRout;R inpÞ. There are also three new lines related to
ANN tuples in the rule Rcas (the bottom three lines). These
lines enforce the behavior of the helping mechanism by
defining exactly in which conditions a cas invocation can be
executed (respecting the helping mechanism). One invoca-
tion can be threaded if one of the following conditions are
satisfied: 1) the preferred process for the position has not
announced an invocation, 2) the preferred process for the
position announced an invocation but it had already been
threaded, or 3) the invocation being threaded is the one that
was announced by the preferred process.
The proof of the correctness of the algorithm is based on
the following three lemmas:
Lemma 3. For any execution of the system, the following
properties are invariants of the PEATS used in Algorithm 4:
1. For any pos   1, there is at most one tuple
hSEQ;pos;invi in the tuple space.
2. For any tuple hSEQ;pos;invi in the tuple space with
pos > 1, there is exactly one tuple hSEQ;pos   1;invi
in the space.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of
the equivalent lemma for the lock-free construction
(Lemma 1). The invariants are enforced by the policies,
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part of the rule Rcas that enforces the invariants
ðinvokeðp;casðhSEQ;pos;xi;hSEQ;pos;inviÞÞ^formalðxÞ
^ðpos¼1_9y:hSEQ;pos   1;yi2TSÞ) is identical in the
policies of both algorithms (Figs. 7 and 8). t u
Lemma 4. An invocation inv made by a correct process pi is
threaded in position pos in a universal construction with
pos   1 threaded operations if either 1) there is no announced
but not threaded invocation inv0 made by process pj 6¼ pi, with
j ¼ pos mod n or 2) i ¼ pos mod n. If an invocation does
not satisfy any of these two conditions, then it cannot be
threaded.
Proof. Let us prove the first part of the lemma. Consider a
process pi trying to thread inv. An invocation inv
threaded in position pos is represented by the tuple
hSEQ;pos;invi. The policy defined in Fig. 8 allows those
tuples to be inserted in the PEATS in a single way: using
the cas operation. If there are exactly pos   1 threaded
tuples, then there is no tuple in position pos, so process pi
will enter the “if” clause of lines 8-19. We have to prove
that if one of the conditions of the lemma is satisfied,
then the rule Rcas allows the insertion of the SEQ tuple,
i.e., allows inv to be threaded:
. Condition 1. This condition assumes i 6¼
preferred ¼ pos mod n. If there is no invocation
announced by process pj with j ¼ pos mod n
(case 1), then the “if” condition of line 9 will not
be satisfied, pi will execute line 14 and the
invocation to be threaded (variable tinv) will be
set to inv. If there is such an announcement, but
the invocation was already threaded (case 2), then
both “if” conditions of lines 9 and 10 will be
satisfied and the invocation to be threaded ðtinvÞ
will also be set to inv. Therefore, in both cases,
process pi in the cas of line 16 tries to insert the
invocation inv in the position pos. This operation
will succeed only if the conditions of rule Rcas are
satisfied, but this happens in both cases:
– case 1: ð69y : hANN;pos mod n;yi2TSÞ will
be satisfied;
– case 2: ð9y : ðhANN;pos mod n;yi2TS^
9z : hSEQ;z;yi2TSÞÞ will be satisfied.
. Condition 2. If pi is the preferred process to thread
an operation in pos ði ¼ preferred ¼ pos mod nÞ,
then it will execute lines 9 and 14, then execute
the cas trying to insert a tuple hSEQ;pos;invi.I t
will succeed because, if pi is correct, it has
announced its invocation using an ANN tuple,
and consequently, the conditions of rule Rcas will
be satisfied. In particular, the last condition will
be satisfied since ðhANN;pos mod n;invi2TSÞ.
Let us now prove the second part of the lemma. If
some process tries to insert a tuple without satisfying any
of the conditions of the lemma, it will not succeed simply
because the only way to insert a SEQ tuple is through the
operation cas and the Rcas rule will only allow an
insertion that satisfies these conditions. t u
Lemma 5. The universal construction of the Algorithm 4 is
wait-free.
Proof. This lemma is proved by contradiction. Let   be an
execution with n processes in which a correct process pi
invokes an operation inv but never receives the reply.
We have to show that   does not exist.
When pi starts executing Algorithm 4, it inserts an
ANN tuple for its invocation inv in the PEATS (line 4).
Suppose that after the insertion of this announcement,
the last SEQ tuple inserted in the space has sequence
number pos. We have to consider two cases:
. If there is a configuration in   in which there is no
process pj 6¼ pi with an invocation that is an-
nounced but not threaded, then pi will execute the
cas successfully due to Lemma 4 (Condition 1).
. If all processes (correct or faulty) keep executing
operations on the emulated object after the
announcement of inv, then eventually there will
be a position pos0 such that all positions until
pos0   1 will have operations threaded and
pos0 mod n ¼ i. Lemma 4 (Condition 2) guaran-
tees that inv is threaded.
In both cases, inv is threaded, then pi executes lines 17,
20, and 23 and returns reply. This fact contradicts the
definition of  . t u
The next theorem proves that Algorithm 4 is a wait-free
universal construction.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 4 provides a wait-free universal
construction.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that there is a total order on the
operations executed in the emulated object. An inspec-
tion of the algorithm shows that a process updates its
copy of the state of the emulated object by applying the
deterministic function applyT to all SEQ tuples in the
order defined by the sequence number. This way, all
operations are executed in the same order by all correct
processes, and this order is according to the sequential
specification of the object provided by the function apply,
which satisfies linearizability. Lemma 5 proves that the
construction is wait-free. t u
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Fig. 8. Access policy for the PEATS used in Algorithm 4.7R ELATED WORK
In this paper, we present several shared memory algorithms
that tolerate Byzantine faults using an augmented tuple
space. To the best of our knowledge, the only other works
that use this type of object to resolve fundamental
distributed computing problems are [14] and [15]. How-
ever, in contrast to this paper, these works address only the
wait-free consensus problem in fail-stop systems (no
Byzantine failures).
Asynchronous shared memory systems with processes
that can fail in a Byzantine way have been first studied
independently by Attie [10] and Malkhi et al. [11]. The work
in [10] shows that weak consensus cannot be solved using
only resettable objects.
6 This result implies that algorithms
for solving consensus in this model must use some kind of
persistent (nonresettable) object like sticky bits. The PEATS
used in our algorithms can be viewed as a persistent object
since the access policies do not allow processes to reset the
state of the object.
The work presented in [11] uses shared memory objects
with ACLs to define a t-threshold strong binary consensus
algorithmandat-resilientuniversalconstruction.Theformer
uses 2t þ 1 sticky bits and requires n  ð t þ 1Þð2t þ 1Þ
processes. This paper also shows that there can be no strong
binary consensus algorithm with n   3t processes in this
model of computation.
In a more recent work, Alon et al. [9] extend previous
results by presenting a strong binary consensus algorithm
that attains optimal resiliency ðn   3t þ 1Þ using an ex-
ponential number of sticky bits and requiring also an
exponential number of rounds. That work proves several
lower bounds related to the number of required objects to
implement consensus, including a tight trade-off character-
izing the number of objects required to implement strong
consensus: a polynomial number of processes needs an
exponential number of objects and vice-versa. This result
not only emphasizes the power of ACLs in limiting
malicious processes but also shows the limitations of this
model, especially in terms of the large number of objects
required to attain optimal resilience. The approach pro-
posed in this paper uses a more powerful protection model
than ACLs so this trade-off does not apply since our objects
cannot be subverted by faulty processes.
As stated in this paper, our algorithms are much more
simple and efficient than those in [11] and [9]. It could be
argued that this happens because we assume a more
powerful model and shared memory object (PEATS and
policy enforcement instead of sticky bits and ACLs) which
would be much more costly to implement. Obviously, it is
more difficult to implement a PEATS than sticky bits and
ACLs in hardware or at operating system level, but as
argued in this paper and in previous papers in the area [11],
[9], Byzantine shared memory only makes sense when
considering shared memory emulation on message-passing
systems
7 like, for instance, [1], [2], [3], [4], [6], and [8]. In
that case, shared memory is implemented by a set of
servers, so implementing the sticky bit set operation or the
PEATS cas operation (both with consensus number n)
requires exactly the same: a Byzantine fault-tolerant atomic
multicast protocol that delivers the requests to all servers in
the same order. Therefore, in terms of the costs relevant in
Byzantine protocols for this emulation—time complexity,
communication complexity, cryptography used—they are
identical in both cases since the protocols required are also
the same. Implementing simple ACLs or policy enforce-
ment requires the same additional resource: a reference
monitor deployed in each replica to verify access policies.
The big difference here is that an ACL monitor only verifies
if a process trying to execute an operation on an object has
its ID on the operation ACL while a policy enforcement
monitor has to evaluate a predicate. As can be seen in the
algorithms presented in this paper, the predicates are, in
general, very simple and can be implemented efficiently
with little (local) processing overhead. If one takes into
account the improvements of our protocols when compared
with previous ones, this little extra processing is worth it.
To show the feasibility of our approach, we have
implemented the DEPSPACE system [26], a complete
Byzantine fault-tolerant PEATS developed in Java. Experi-
mental results have shown that its performance is compe-
titive with nondependable tuple space implementations.
The type of policy enforcement used in this paper was
inspired by the law-governed interaction approach [24] and its
use in protecting centralized tuple spaces [30].
8C ONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposal for distributed computing with shared
memory accessed by Byzantine processes presented in this
paper differs from the previous model where objects are
protected by ACLs. Our approach is based on the use of
fine-grained access policies that specify rules that allow or
deny an operation invocation to be executed in an object
based on the arguments of the operation, its invoker, and
the state of the object. The constructions presented in this
paper (consensus and universal objects) demonstrate that
this approach allows the development of simple and
elegant algorithms, at the cost of defining access policies
for the shared memory objects they use.
We show that a particular type of PEO—the PEATS—is
an attractive choice as support for coordinating processes
that can be subjected to Byzantine failures due to its
programming simplicity (few versatile operations), flex-
ibility (can implement almost any data structure), and
power (in terms of the wait-free hierarchy [18]). The
combination of these advantages with fine-grained security
policies allows the implementation of simple algorithms for
the Byzantine fault model, especially if compared with
previous solutions for this model [9], [11]. A consequence of
this result is that fine-grained policy enforcement is a more
adequate protection mechanism for dependable services/
shared memory objects when compared with ACLs, which
are considered the standard protection mechanism for these
kinds of systems.
Regarding the implementation of PEATS (or any other
PEO), the amount of resources required to implement these
objects is the same of objects protected by ACLs previously
used to solve problems in our model: a local reference
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6. An object o is resettable if, given any of its reachable states, there is a
sequence of operations that can return the object back to its initial state [10].
7. The study of Byzantine faults in real shared memory systems is
considered uninteresting because as these systems are implemented on
tightly coupled architectures, the presence of a malicious process usually
indicates that the whole system is compromised.monitor deployed in every replica of the object implemen-
tation [26]. We remark that both the PEO model and the
algorithms based on the PEATS are well suited for
coordination of nontrusted processes in practical systems.
We envision system models where the PEATS (or another
PEO) is deployed on a fixed and small set of servers and is
used by an unknown, dynamic, and unreliable set of
processes that need to coordinate themselves. Programming
synchronization primitives on these system models should
be much simpler than using Byzantine fault-tolerant
synchronization protocols for message-passing systems.
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